Abstract-Health technology assessment (HTA) has received increasing support over the past twenty years in both North America and Europe. The justifi cation for this fi eld of policy-oriented research is that evidence about the effi cacy, safety, and cost-effectiveness of technology should contribute to decision and policy making. However, concerns about the ability of HTA producers to increase the use of their fi ndings by decision makers have been expressed. Although HTA practitioners have recognized that dissemination activities need to be intensifi ed, why and how particular approaches should be adopted is still under debate. Using an institutional theory perspective, this article examines HTA as a means of implementing knowledge-based change within health care systems. It presents the results of a case study on the dissemination strategies of six Canadian HTA agencies. Chief executive offi cers and executives (n = 11), evaluators (n = 19), and communications staff (n = 10) from these agencies were interviewed. Our results indicate that the target audience of HTA is frequently limited to policy makers, that three confl icting visions of HTA dissemination coexist, that active dissemination strategies have only occasionally been applied, and that little attention has been paid to the management of diverging views about the value of health technology. Our discussion explores the strengths, limitations, and trade-offs associated with the three visions. Further efforts should be deployed within
agencies to better articulate a shared vision and to devise dissemination strategies that are consistent with this vision.
Dissemination: Phase II of HTA Development?
Health technology assessment (HTA) has received increasing support over the past twenty years in both North America and Europe. The justifi cation for HTA development is that information about the effi cacy, safety, and cost-effectiveness of health technologies should improve decision and policy making (Battista et al. 1994; Cookson and Maynard 2000) . HTA also addresses social, legal, and ethical aspects when they are perceived as bearing on decision making at both clinical and policy levels. This is why HTA has been defi ned as policy-oriented, multidisciplinary research even though, in practice, the emphasis is on epidemiology and economic analyses (Giacomini 1999; Lehoux and Blume 2000) . A look back at the scientifi c achievements of HTA producers since the mid-1980s reveals a major drive to standardize and refi ne methods (grading the strength of evidence, measuring cost-effectiveness, quality-adjusted life years [QALYs] ). This has been consolidated by the creation of an International Society for Technology Assessment in Health Care (now HTA [Health Technology Assessment International]), which holds annual scientifi c meetings and organizes professional working groups, and the launching of the International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care (Banta and Perry 1997) .
In this article, we propose to explore a recent issue that can be considered part of the second phase in HTA development-increasing dissemination. Indeed, healthy criticism has called into question the impact of HTA on decision and policy making, and the active dissemination of fi ndings was identifi ed as a major issue as early as the mid-1990s (Battista et al. 1994 (Battista et al. , 1999 Cookson and Maynard 2000) . This concern with dissemination, we believe, has forced evaluators to refl ect on and become more familiar with the way decisions and policies are made. HTA producers have had to search for their audiences and introduce principles and notions that have been recently promoted by communications and knowledge transfer experts (Bero and Jadad 1997; Bero et al. 1998) . We therefore posit that Phase II represents a relatively new challenge for HTA producers that is worth examining at this point in time when strategies to meet the challenge are just emerging. Our objectives are twofold: to examine how six Canadian HTA agencies disseminate their fi ndings and interact with an array of decision makers and to provide insights into the processes supporting the institutionalization of HTA as a tool for promoting knowledge-based change in health care systems.
This article is divided into fi ve parts. First, we summarize the literature on the use of health research in decision and policy making and more precisely defi ne the institutional theory perspective we have adopted. Second, we briefl y describe the case study we designed and our analytical approach. Third, the results are presented, emphasizing the main target audiences, three visions of the rationale behind dissemination, dissemination strategies, and relationships with users. Fourth, the discussion examines the strengths and weaknesses of these visions and their institutional trade-offs. We conclude by emphasizing the need for HTA producers to discuss and clarify their overarching approach to knowledge transfer to ensure dissemination tools are deployed effectively.
Institutionalization of HTA in Canada
In industrialized countries, HTA has taken on slightly different forms, with the former U.S. Offi ce of Technology Assessment (OTA) often used as the organizational model. In Canada, between 1988 and , fi ve provincial agencies or formal units and one federal agency were established to conduct HTA and health services research. 1 Because health care is a provincial responsibility, and the provinces vary greatly in size and resources, each of these agencies is structured differently and has evolved within its own specifi c institutional context (health reforms, restructuring, etc.) . The types of agencies represented include university-based research groups, arm's length government agencies, and independent nonprofi t agencies. 2 Although HTA production does not seem to be affected much by the agency's structure, it does seem to be shaped by the type of relationships the agency has established with the various stakeholders.
There seems to be no optimal model for an assessment agency. If the agency is too close to the policy process it can lose credibility with the wider community, lack some resources of information and be unresponsive to new data and perspectives-the political agenda of the day can dominate. If the agency is too far from the policy area-as may be the 1. Two of the agencies we studied are much more involved in health services research than in HTA. However, throughout the text we use simply HTA to facilitate reading.
2. Another model that is less common is the hospital-based HTA unit that provides advice to a single hospital or a consortium of hospitals (e.g., the Comité d'Évaluation et de Diffusion des Innovations Technologiques [CEDIT] in France).
case, for example, with university-based groups-assessments may run the risk of having limited impact by not taking account of the nature of the target and not meeting requirements for timing and political relevance. (Hailey 1993: 253) Furthermore, the extent to which an HTA agency can bring about concrete changes in clinical practice is affected by the policy and regulatory arena prevailing in its jurisdiction (Bos et al. 1996) . For example, the regulation of technology and drugs (approval, reimbursement), the implementation of clinical practice guidelines, and the transmitting of information to patients and the general public may all prove essential in determining the ultimate impact of HTA (Battista et al. 1999) . In other words, if regulatory agencies and professional groups do not act on the conclusions of HTA reports, the overall impact of HTA will probably remain limited. In fact, to identify the payback from HTA (Buxton and Hanney 1996) , we need to defi ne who the requesters and potential users are and to draw attention to the actions these users can take and are likely to be accountable for. This may partly explain why the recently established National Institute for Clinical Excellence in the United Kingdom was structurally designed to include an explicit and open stakeholders consultation process for each guidance it publishes, as well as general mechanisms for ensuring a certain level of accountability on the part of the agency.
According to Jonathan Lomas (1990: 535) , the Canadian policy arena comprises several loci of decision making: "While our formal structure is parliamentary, we have been infl uenced from south of the border by the concept of interest-group legitimacy, the need for consultation and collaboration, and the general right of the public to be represented rather than governed." As a result, health researchers have had diffi culty knowing where to target their fi ndings, while at the same time public acceptance of the core principles supporting a given policy initiative plays an important enlightenment role in the use of research fi ndings. 3 For Lomas (ibid.: 526), it seems clear that "research information is but one of the inputs to the policy process, and one that operates, if it operates at all, less on the specifi cs of policy and more on the beliefs and assumptions that underlie it." 3. Such an enlightenment function was instrumental in the emergence of the Canadian national health insurance in the 1960s, which was facilitated by the fact that researchers and policy makers were both arguing on behalf of the public's good. "This congruence in core values between researchers, their government audience, and the public therefore allowed the research information on inequitable access, inadequate private insurance coverage for the poor, and the high administrative cost of multiple private insurers to contribute to the design of a government-administered health insurance system" (Lomas 1990: 533) .
The Canadian constitutional division of powers between the federal and the provincial governments also makes the issue more complex. In principle, the federal government has no direct decision-making authority, but by "creatively using its authority within constitutional boundaries, it has been able to infl uence" provincial decision making (ibid.: 536) . This creative potency is striking in light of the federal surplus in 2000 (after the major cutbacks in payment transfers to provinces and territories in the mid-1990s), which enabled the federal government to generously increase its investment in technology (medical imaging devices, information technology) across the country. Nonetheless, there are examples in which the adoption of a technology (e.g., the left ventricular assist device) is seriously compromised by both lack of resources and the economic impact of such innovations on current budgets. Because beliefs about the inherently positive value of technology are usually strong and widespread, regulating access to technology is a thorny issue, even when the technology's effectiveness is proven to be limited (Bastian 1998; Johri and Lehoux 2003) . 4 Thus, the nature of the Canadian policy arena means that HTA would have to transform the views of numerous decision makers in different structures, including the public's beliefs, before any effects would be felt. Consequently, for Canadian agencies, Phase II in HTA development entails not only defi ning where the target audiences are, but also identifying how to shape an array of stakeholder beliefs by providing them with scientifi c evidence about technology.
Conceptualizing HTA Dissemination within the Broader Health Policy Arena
Since the late 1980s, the impact of health research has been a topic of increasing interest to both researchers and funding organizations (Battista, Feeny, and Hodge 1995; Lomas 1991 Lomas , 1993 Hailey and Crowe 1993; Lavis et al. 2002) . The impacts of consensus conferences (Lomas 1991) ; clinical guidelines (Lomas et al. 1989; Giacomini et al. 2000) ; continuous medical education (Oxman et al. 1995) ; and fi nancial, organizational, and legislative mechanisms (Durieux, Viens-Bitker, and Blum-Boisgard 1988; Hailey, Cowley, and Dankiw 1990) on policy making and clinical practice have been investigated. A number of papers have also focused more precisely on the impact of HTA (Hailey, Cowley, and Dankiw 1990; Jacob and Battista 1993; Battista et al. 1994; Jacob and McGregor 1997) . Overall, the literature underscores the importance of the technology life cycle 5 (Hailey 1993: 253) and the fact that HTA use may also be impeded or delayed by the specifi cs of the policy domain, including the limitations of policy instruments, a lack of consensus between government and professional groups, and the emergence of other pressing policy issues (ibid.). Indeed, incentives and rewards may play an important role in the uptake of research by policy makers (Rich 1997; Lavis et al. 2002) .
The goal of most of these studies was to determine whether the production of scientifi c information causes changes in behavior at the clinical level or in decision making at the administrative and policy levels. These studies revealed, however, that the relationship between information production and its impact is far from straightforward. 6 There are a variety of different approaches to dissemination, and each approach may be associated with a different level of research uptake. 7 Furthermore, information use may be instrumental (i.e., immediate and observable) or conceptual (i.e., delayed and diffused; Weiss 1991; Huberman 1989).
5. To arrive at a judgment about the value of a given technology, HTA provides different kinds of information depending on the technology life cycle: adoption, diffusion, implementation, and renewal. Because the scientifi c thrust behind HTA is to synthesize available published results from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and other quasi-experimental designs (cohort studies, case control studies), the availability of hard data does in fact vary with the status of a given technology. In other words, the extent to which a technology has been used and tested in clinical settings largely determines the hardness of the evidence available.
6. A particular outcome of information use may result from information contributing to the process of achieving a particular objective, information infl uencing the process of reaching an objective in a positive or negative sense, or information causing an objective or outcome to be reached (Rich 1997: 13) . Rich also defi nes key terms such as use, which "may simply mean that information has been received and read" (15) but not necessarily understood. Utility would involve the "user's judgment that information could be relevant or of value" (15). The term infl uence suggests "that information has contributed to a decision, an action, or to a way of thinking about a problem" (15). Finally, impact implies that "information was used and it led directly to a decision or to action" (15).
7. Richard Grol (1997) identifi ed seven approaches to knowledge transfer at the clinical level. Educational approaches assume that individuals striving for professional competence drive change and such approaches generally rely on small group interactive learning. Epidemiological approaches assume that rational evidence will convince individuals whether to adopt a given practice. Marketing approaches assume that a message must be convincing, targeted, and packaged according to the preferences of the audience. Behavioral approaches posit that human practice is infl uenced by particular stimuli, such as feedback, reminders, and incentives. Social interaction approaches emphasize the infl uence of socialization and group interactions, focusing on the use of champions, opinion leaders, or respected peers. Organizational approaches seek to create the necessary conditions for collective change, such as structural factors, coordination mechanisms, or quality improvement processes. Finally, coercive approaches presume that control is necessary to change fi xed habits and routines, relying on the implementation of laws, regulation, accreditation, budgeting, and complaints procedures. According to Grol, each of these approaches to changing clinical practice may be useful and effective, depending on the desired changes, the barriers and facilitators, the target group, and the setting.
Because very few empirical studies have clarifi ed how various types of interaction between HTA producers and users may facilitate or impede the uptake of HTA fi ndings, we decided to examine in detail the processes through which HTA fi ndings are currently being produced, disseminated, and retailed by Canadian HTA agencies and the constraints and expectations of users at different levels in the health care system. This article, which is part of this broader study, is less concerned with how dissemination strategies reach their target (or not) than with how HTA producers conceive of HTA dissemination and their interaction with potential users. This is important for several reasons: there is no consensus about how HTA should be disseminated, a weak conceptualization of knowledge transfer in HTA could impede the development of effective communication strategies, and examining how dissemination is conceptualized and performed by the CEOs and staff of the Canadian agencies will contribute to knowledge about the promotion of science-based public policies.
Our conceptual framework is inspired not only by the literature summarized above, but also by the need to emphasize the broader health policy arena in which Phase II unfolds (see fi g. 1). From an institutional theory perspective (Edquist and Johnson 1997) , HTA can be seen as a means of implementing knowledge-based change within the health care system. Such an approach implies that sets of routines, established practices, and rules that coordinate the relations and interactions between an HTA agency and the organized groups that have a stake in health issues in a given jurisdiction have been developed and worked out (Foray 1997) . Indeed, HTA agencies can be seen as "knowledge infrastructures" similar to universities, publicly supported institutes, and libraries (Smith 1997) . The innovations and change generated by such infrastructures are partially infl uenced by the prevailing regulatory system (formal rules, legal system) and the wider sociopolitical context that contributes to defi ning public policy objectives (ibid.). The type of products delivered by these infrastructures is shaped by a fairly complex network of suppliers and customers and of labor skills and expertise. Indeed, the resources that can be co-opted and the rules governing this process both constrain and enhance knowledge creation. Treating "institutions as chronically reproduced rules and resources" (Giddens 1984: 375) that gradually evolve through repeated interactions appears compelling because of the dual relationship between knowledge-producing organizations and their environment. Adopting an institutional theory perspective on HTA agencies therefore means conceiving of an overall system comprised of a number of public and private organizations that remain rooted in specifi c geographical and cultural contexts. "Science and technology, like economic forces generally, are international; but how they operate depends on how they interact with specifi cally national or regional institutions and environments" (Smith 1997: 89) .
More precisely, our framework (fi g. 1) posits that the relationships between an HTA agency and its users will be structured by two types of HTA outputs (Lehoux, Battista, and Lance 2000) . First, an agency disseminates HTA reports, which may reduce uncertainty or help manage confl ict over the merits of medical interventions by identifying, among other things, their costs and benefi ts. HTA reports are concrete, tangible outputs, which may mobilize a fairly broad scope of knowledge (effi cacy, safety, costs, ethical and legal issues, etc.; Lehoux et al. 2004) . Second, an agency initiates processes that support the institutionalization of various HTA-derived products (clinical practice guidelines, seminars, methodological guidelines, patient leafl ets). The nature and breadth of these processes will depend on the overall approach to knowledge transfer, the importance given to dissemination activities, and the perceived need to interact with diverse groups of users. The HTA audience can be classifi ed into the following four groups: health care providers, governments and administrations, patients and the public, and the pharmaceutical and biomedical equipment industry. The fi rst two can be considered direct users, whereas the last two should be considered more broadly as stakeholders. Within this framework, HTA agencies and their dissemination activities seek to infl uence, and in turn are infl uenced by, a specifi c institutional environment. As mentioned earlier, this environment can be characterized by the presence of regulatory bodies, lobby groups, and other knowledge producers; by the type of rules and routines that are established within and between these organizations; by the sociopolitical orientation of previous and present governments; and by the availability of fi nancial and human resources. Finally, this framework recognizes that the decisions of users are shaped not only by HTA outputs, but also by fi nancial, administrative, legal, and political incentives or disincentives (Lomas 1993) . The next section will clarify how these concepts and their relationships were empirically examined in our case study of six Canadian HTA agencies.
Methods
In February 1999, CEOs from eight important groups that produce HTA and health services research across Canada were invited to participate in a meeting at which our initial research proposal was presented and discussed. A number of issues were debated and six agencies formally agreed to participate in the study. In March 2000, a second proposal that took the concerns and expectations of the participating agencies into account was submitted to a national funding agency. An advisory committee that included all of the CEOs was appointed, 8 and the study began in January 2001. Approval by University of Montreal Faculty of Medicine Ethics Committee was obtained.
According to Robert Yin (1994) and Diane Vaughan (1992) , the case study is an appropriate research design to document a complex phenomenon when the context in which it occurs has a specifi c infl uence on its dynamics. Studying multiple instances of the same case, but in different contexts, should generate instructive comparisons and robust fi ndings when the same patterns are revealed by a cross-case analysis. This design seems particularly well suited for an in-depth analysis of how the six agencies attempt to infl uence decision makers in their respective institutional environments. Table 1 provides general information about the 8. The role of the committee is to comment on research methodology, facilitate access to informants and useful documents, comment on preliminary fi ndings, and provide feedback on the results of the study to its staff.
9. These agencies were chosen because they represent the most important (if not only) producer of HTA in their jurisdiction. They all receive public funding to accomplish this mandate and are often the fi rst organization to which the minister or Ministry of Health turns when needing expert advice about technologies. structure and resources of the six cases. 9 The agencies were located in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario (one provincial and one federal agency), and Quebec.
To examine the broader issues addressed in our research project, we used both qualitative and quantitative data (Datta 1997) . For this particular article, interviews with the CEOs and staff of the agencies and documents analysis (annual reports, Web sites, newsletters, etc.) are the main sources of information. One of the authors (ST) interviewed forty individuals distributed across the agencies (see table 2 ). All executives and communication offi cers were interviewed systematically. We selected evaluators with a minimum of three years' experience (Marshall and Rossman 1989) . The interviews were designed to elicit detailed information on the following fi ve issues: (1) organization of the agency, (2) production of reports, (3) relationships with users, (4) dissemination strategies, and (5) institutional environment in which the agency operates (an interview guide is available on request). All semidirected interviews (thirty-fi ve to ninety minutes in duration) were recorded and transcribed in electronic format (ibid.). The software NUD*IST was used to code 10 and selectively retrieve verbatim extracts (Richards and Richards 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1990) .
The qualitative analytical approach that we used is social phenomenology, which focuses on how "members of society constitute the world of everyday life, especially how individuals consciously develop meaning out of social interactions" (Creswell 1998: 53) . This approach was particu- 10. A mixed strategy of coding was adopted (Eisenhardt 1989) . Some codes were predefi ned based on the conceptual framework (e.g., target audience, dissemination methods, infl uential groups), whereas others emerged during the preliminary analysis of the interviews (e.g., the social process in the search for evidence, keeping a reasonable distance, managing confl icting views). The fi rst wave of coding was done by ST and then reviewed by PL. larly helpful in identifying how HTA producers, through their experience in interacting with diverse audiences, anticipated and defi ned the informational needs of their potential targets. From a methodological standpoint, interviews were seen as containing two types of accounts. The fi rst type is what Anthony Giddens (1984: 374) describes as discursive consciousness, that is, "what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action." The assumption here is that "people who participate in any setting acquire important knowledge about that setting which may be an important resource for the researcher" (Murphy et al. 1998: 122) . The second type of account exemplifi es a "rationalization of action," which is linked to the ability of actors to " ' [keep] in touch' with the grounds of what they do, as they do it, such that if asked by others, they can supply reasons for their activities" (Giddens 1984: 376) . As will be shown further, questioning HTA producers about the ultimate impact of their work revealed considerable variations in the way they rationalize the purpose and means of knowledge dissemination.
Analyses were performed in two integrated steps. First, the complete set of interviews was analyzed to detect themes and recurrent patterns in what interviewees say about dissemination. Comparing interviewees' rationalizations helped identify three robust patterns across the groups (executive, evaluator, communications staff). These patterns typify three visions of the rationale behind dissemination. A vision encapsulates the answer to two interrelated questions: Should an agency increase the dissemination of its fi ndings? What impact may be expected?
Second, we drew up tables based on both the document analysis and the content of interviews (Miles and Huberman 1984) to support intracase and intercase analyses emphasizing what agencies do in terms of dissemination. Intracase analyses focused, for each agency, on the audience it targeted, the dissemination strategies used, and the types of interaction it established with potential users. The goal of the intercase analyses was to identify similarities and differences across agencies along two axes: the nature of their dissemination strategies (active versus passive) and the level of user involvement (high versus low ; Eisenhardt 1989; Vaughan 1992) . Passive strategies were methods that did not involve any direct interaction with the end user, for example, posting a PDF report on a Web site. Active strategies included face-to-face meetings, symposia, and debriefi ngs. User involvement was qualifi ed as high when users were involved early on and regularly throughout the entire evaluation process. It was qualifi ed as low when users were informed about the assessment and its fi ndings, but did not participate in any way in the evaluation process. The three visions were then used as a heuristic device to schematize the strategies the agencies choose to deploy, as well their understanding of how decision making would be infl uenced through the transfer of HTA fi ndings. The two analytical axes, which make more explicit the key features of the three visions, lead to a comparative, graphical positioning of the six agencies (Miles and Huberman 1984) . Analyses were discussed and fi nalized during meetings involving the four authors. Preliminary results were shared with the CEOs and staff of the agencies. A face-to-face discussion with the CEOs enabled providing more depth to our analyses and clarifying certain areas. Some verbatim extracts were translated from French to English and slightly edited for the purpose of this article (and for preserving anonymity).
Results: Three Visions and Multiple Ad Hoc Strategies
This section presents the results of our case study in four parts. It focuses on the processes supporting the institutionalization of HTA-derived products as identifi ed in our conceptual framework. We fi rst briefl y describe the production processes and target audiences of the six agencies. Second, three visions offering different approaches to knowledge transfer are defi ned. Third, we explain how several active and passive dissemination strategies are deployed in parallel. Fourth, we examine the types of relationships that agencies have established with users and summarize our results by positioning the six agencies in relation to their dissemination strategies and relationships with users.
Overview of the Production Processes and Audiences of the Agencies
HTA proponents have always stressed the multidisciplinary nature of their endeavor. As one might expect, we observed a rich diversity in the disciplines represented in the six agencies. The educational backgrounds of the interviewees included medicine, pharmacy, economics, anthropology, sociology, political science, ethics, and journalism. However, a distinct organizational culture prevails within a given agency, due to the particular mix of disciplines present (with an emphasis on either biomedical or social issues) and the specifi c incentives associated with the supporting structure. For instance, the staff of one agency (1) adhered chiefl y to an academic model of HTA, whereas the staff of two other agencies (4 and 6) continually emphasized their role as providers of a public service. In the former case, the staff was much more inclined to value publications in scientifi c journals and maintained close links with university research groups. In the latter case, the staff stressed how important it was that a publicly funded agency give back to the local people the services they have paid for in their taxes. However, all respondents considered methodological rigor and independence to be key attributes of HTA.
A striking difference between the agencies was found in the topics on which they had published HTA reports. This resulted in the agencies each having a slightly different organizational pitch. Although medical imaging devices remain a frequent topic for assessment across the board, the emergence of biotechnology, the increased provision of ambulatory and home care services, and the experimentation of new implants have introduced signifi cant diversity in the portfolios and institutional environments of HTA agencies. On one hand, agencies must be able to rely on staff with diversifi ed expertise to fulfi ll their roles as knowledge infrastructures. On the other hand, the technologies an agency chooses to assess contribute to creating specifi c categories of users and stakeholders. For example, drug evaluation usually involves methodological challenges that are best dealt with by economists and clinical epidemiologists because the main policy question is, Should the drug be included in the drug plan? As a result, drug plan managers become the primary clients for agencies that evaluate drugs. Indirectly, through the lobbying of the policy makers, patient groups will be seen as stakeholders. Controversial interventions or topics with a high public profi le such as electroconvulsive therapy, midwifery, or the treatment of autistic children are often handled by multidisciplinary teams that can address social and ethical issues. Hence agencies assessing these topics have to deal with a different array of institutional players, including the media, which may deliberately seek out controversial issues. In general, HTA agencies address topics and issues based on the resources they can mobilize, for example, the disciplinary background of their staff and their ability to fi nd and recruit specialized evaluators. Several interviewees indicated that their relationships with user groups with a stake in a particular sector (for example, cardiovascular disease; obstetrics; ear, nose, and throat surgery) had been built over several years. The organizational culture of each agency may thus be shaped by the expertise of its staff and its experience, which has accumulated through repeated interaction with a fairly limited number of players around the development and dissemination of reports in a specifi c fi eld.
The production processes of the six agencies were similar in several ways. HTA agencies rarely engage in primary data collection; rather, they synthesize published evidence and may exploit provincial administrative or clinical databases. A few agencies may administer surveys or conduct interviews to better document organizational aspects and prevailing clinical practices or funding arrangements. Agencies respond to requests that are submitted mainly by their funder (often the provincial or federal government) and, in certain provinces, by any other administrative level of the health care system. In certain provinces, agencies sign an agreement whereby they undertake to produce a minimum number of reports per year for their funder. In other cases, agencies have a certain degree of fl exibility in deciding whether they will provide a full assessment or simply guidance based on a brief literature review. Nonetheless, most of the assessment reports are initiated by the agencies themselves, sometimes according to priorities that have been established with the help of an advisory committee or after an internal approval process (i.e., by a scientifi c board). 11 Despite the fact that HTA methodology has been signifi cantly standardized over the past fi fteen years, we observed clear differences in the production processes of the six agencies. A few agencies sometimes contract out reports to university-or hospital-based researchers. Three agencies (3, 5, and 6) have set up an advisory committee that includes a broad array of stakeholders (two include a member representing the public) whose main task is to contribute to priority setting. Two agencies (2 and 4) insisted on the relevance of defi ning the evaluation question with the requesters. One agency (2) has even experimented with helping other groups conduct their own assessment, thus adopting a mentoring role with people not formally trained in HTA. In a few agencies, projects are led by one evaluator who is supported by collaborators with a variety of expertise. This is in sharp contrast to other agencies in which evaluators reported they felt isolated during the preparation of the assessment. Only one agency (5) hired an ethicist and a lawyer. Two agencies (1 and 5) encouraged both the recruitment of researchers affi liated with universities and publication in scientifi c journals.
During the interviews, we asked informants to defi ne who their main users were. Not surprisingly, high-ranking offi cials of the Ministry of Health, medical associations, and physicians were the fi rst users mentioned. Next came regional health authorities (with the exception of Ontario, all Canadian provinces have regionalized their health care systems), hospital managers, and various regulatory bodies. For two agencies (1 and 3), the public was not a target audience, whereas the other four stressed that although HTA should be made available to the public, they did not know exactly how to effectively achieve this goal. Biomedical equipment and pharmaceutical industries were not perceived as potential users, but rather as groups who may react negatively toward HTA. A few anecdotes confi rmed the existence of such tensions. In three agencies (1, 3, and 5), we noted that the evaluators and CEOs held signifi cantly divergent views on who constituted the main users. Evaluators were more likely to include the public and patient associations as relevant target audiences, whereas CEOs focused on policy makers. For example, according to one evaluator (agency 1), "If patients buy into your fi ndings, that really helps infl uence change. To have an informed patient is to have better decision making." However, according to the evaluator's CEO, patients are not a reasonable target: "In terms of trying to bring our data to individual patients, we haven't done much. . . . It wouldn't be a wise use of our resources." Caught in between, the communications offi cer agrees that messages may get easily distorted: "For the general public, it's really hard to fi gure out the numbers. [If a newspaper article] does catch their attention, it tends to be the wrong type of attention."
Nonetheless, most evaluators were making deliberate attempts to make their recommendations meaningful for users. As one communications staff member put it (agency 6), "We try to keep it focused on what their needs are. They are a very practical hands-on group-they don't like a whole bunch of theory. They want things they can take home and use." For an evaluator in the same agency, language matters: "We have a very good communications offi cer who helps us to communicate in plain language, and that's critical. [Being a specialized group of researchers,] we conceptualize the world in a certain way and [decision makers] don't necessarily share this way of thinking. What you have to do is try to identify how they see the world and then frame your communication in that way, which is a challenge. But it's fun trying to fi gure it out." Beyond the general, catch-all categories of users, interviewees insisted that each report had its own very specifi c set of users. Furthermore, this set could be just a few people (policy makers) or thousands of people (clinicians), which makes the task of defi ning the needs and expectations of users even more complex (we will return to this issue later).
To summarize, despite cultural and structural differences, the six Canadian HTA agencies have adopted quite similar production processes (compatible with Phase I defi ned earlier). Although interviewees had a fairly clear idea of who the main users were (and were not), we observed confl icting or divergent views about the rationale behind dissemination.
Three Visions
The interviewees confi rmed that dissemination is a concern of all agencies. Only one agency did not have any communications staff when the study was conducted. However, the level of resources allocated to communication is low (less than 5 percent of the budget). CEOs and senior evaluators seem to be the ones mostly involved in communications, especially that involve the media and high offi cials. In two jurisdictions, agencies have established links with existing organizations whose mandate is to facilitate knowledge transfer in health care, an arrangement that has both advantages and disadvantages. The communications specialists we interviewed indicated that disseminating HTA is time consuming due to the need to devise tailor-made strategies for each report. In addition, evaluators have to be mobilized in the process to ensure that messages remain scientifi cally valid. Thus, when dissemination is delegated to a third party that possesses expertise and skills in knowledge transfer, time may be saved, but message precision may be lost.
During our in-depth analysis of the interviews, we observed three distinct visions that became clearer when respondents explained the purpose and expected impact of investing more effort in knowledge transfer. These visions structured how the interviewees viewed the role of evidence in decision making and how they interacted with potential users.
Vision 1: Science-driven HTA. A number of interviewees mentioned that increased impact on decision making should not be the goal of engaging in dissemination because they felt uncomfortable drawing recommendations from scientifi c results, that is, telling decision makers what to do with the conclusions of reports. They were also extremely doubtful about the competence and accountability of decision makers. Some interviewees felt that decision makers are not as knowledgeable as they should be. According to one CEO (agency 1), "Some decision makers don't have much training in health services research or evidence-based medicine. For example, when I asked one newly appointed civil servant about his background, he said he had a degree in Asian history, had worked in banks, and was keen to learn about health. His portfolio included nursing, primary care reform, and cancer. Well, I mean, what is any report that we produce going to mean to someone like him-zero! It's a bit frightening." This view was shared by evaluators who refused to play the role of lobbyist and who draw a line between scientifi c observation and its translation into policies or action. For example, a report may conclude that a given technology (e.g., catheter reuse) is effective but involves signifi cant risks. Deciding whether these risks are acceptable and can be handled appropriately involves taking political issues into account (such as accountability or public opinion), and this cannot be determined by HTA science. For these HTA producers, the quest for knowledge is a valuable enterprise in itself, whereas decision making belongs to a separate sphere that should not interfere with the production of evidence. 12 This vision indirectly implies that the natural target when disseminating results is the scientifi c audience (including clinicians involved in research) and that decision makers should take responsibility for the potential gap between their decisions and the conclusions of HTA.
Vision 2: Pragmatic HTA. A large number of interviewees believed that the purpose of increased dissemination activities was certainly to infl uence evidence-based decision making but remained skeptical that such a goal would be attained. They recognized that policies and decisions are shaped by several factors, some of which are far beyond HTA's realm of infl uence. Interviewees emphasized that the social and organizational processes in play both pre-and post-decision making are extremely complex. They also discussed how pharmaceutical companies and powerful lobby groups have enormous leverage on the health care system. From this perspective, HTA seems to be a rather small player with limited fi nancial resources compared to the marketing budget spent by drug companies to infl uence both the prescription patterns of physicians and the ability of policy makers to control drug coverage decisions. Interviewees were also inclined to believe that positive messages are easier to implement. As one evaluator (agency 5) noted, "[The level of uptake] depends on our conclusions. When we conclude that a technology is effi cient, not dangerous and that the cost/effi cacy is good too, I think there is a strong incentive. The 12. The fact that HTA is the result of the merging of different disciplines (epidemiology, economic sciences, biostatistics, etc.) and of scientists working in universities or governmental agencies explains why some of them are fairly comfortable in focusing, fi rst and foremost, on producing "good science," even though it may seem contradictory with producing science whose aim is to inform decisions. decision-maker who reads this has confi rmation that he can go ahead with introducing the technology. The clinician will be happy too because he is getting what he wanted." This vision of dissemination implies that even though decision and policy makers remain the most important audiences for HTA, the likelihood that the ultimate outcome will be entirely driven by evidence is limited.
Vision 3: Participatory HTA. A small number of interviewees insisted that the goal behind increased dissemination is to infl uence decision making and that this will happen if users participate in the process of gathering and analyzing evidence. These informants also recognized the importance of political and social factors in affecting decision making, but were perhaps not as skeptical as those who evoked the second vision. They positively believed, and this belief was grounded in past experience, that the social process whereby the meaning of scientifi c observations is debated among evaluators and decision makers is as important as publicizing the conclusions of HTA reports. These evaluators often tried to involve users early on in the evaluation process, particularly to help them make explicit the important questions from their perspective. They also saw themselves in the role of mentors-people who can explain, in plain language, the strength of the evidence, the ethical and social issues at stake for a given technology, and the overall potential and limitations of the scientifi c method. Finally, one evaluator mentioned that at the end of the process, when the report was ready to be released, the users did not really need to be briefed about it since they had been part of the process all along and they were already knowledgeable about the report's content. According to one evaluator (agency 6), the intervention of the communications staff may also modify the production process: "[In a recent report, one] could see the infl uence of the research transfer people in the design of the study, because at several phases, we were contacting our stakeholders at various levels, while traditionally this would have been done, if at all, at the beginning and end. [In this study] it was woven throughout the whole process, which was quite interesting." In other words, the third vision, by internalizing users in the production process, implies a substantially different way of producing HTA.
Because these three visions exemplify very different approaches to knowledge transfer, we performed intra-and intercase analyses to identify how, in practice, the six agencies were disseminating their fi ndings and interacting with users. Tables 3a and 3b summarize the fi ndings of the case analyses. Because dissemination has only been on the agenda in the fi eld of HTA since the mid-1990s, it would not be surprising if the strategies developed by Canadian agencies were sketchy, only partially operationalized, or even experimental in form. They certainly can be described as ad hoc in nature, mainly because they have been applied using a piecemeal approach in which certain controversial reports are disseminated via a fi nely engineered communications plan, whereas others are simply sent by mail accompanied by a cover letter. Nonetheless, the agencies have been rather creative in their efforts to conceptualize their target audiences and adapt the format of reports accordingly. What may be lacking is an overall organizational knowledge transfer policy that orchestrates all of the dissemination activities of evaluators and communications staff and renders more systematic the relationships with users. As one CEO put it (agency 2), "In order to be effective, we need to have a communications plan that's sustainable over time, so that we don't just do it for one report but not for the next two or three, and then we do it for the next report because a media person called. The ad hoc approach is not going to accomplish very much unless there are sustained activities." Among the most common dissemination methods were the ones we labeled passive because they do not involve interaction with the end user (see table 3a ). For instance, all of the agencies systematically mail each report to a wide variety of individuals and institutions (including other HTA agencies, hospitals, and university libraries). Most agencies ask evaluators to draw up, in collaboration with the communications offi cer, an additional mailing list of any stakeholders they encountered when producing the report (e.g., during interviews or phone calls, authors of related publications, heads of clinical departments). All agencies had a Web site and several of them were working on making it more useful by posting downloadable reports in PDF format. Two agencies (2 and 6) were monitoring hits and visits on their Web sites so they could monitor what types of information users were searching for and downloaded and how this usage evolved with the releases on a yearly or monthly basis. Two agencies (2 and 3) used their Web sites more actively by having users register with an e-mail notifi cation system for announcing recent releases. Overall, the informants believed that the electronic versions of reports will become more important than the printed counterparts in the near future.
Active dissemination strategies included the rather unstructured discussions with diverse groups, the routine debriefi ng meetings with a tar-geted group of decision makers, and the decidedly assertive road shows. 13 These had been implemented in two agencies (3 and 6) and seemed to be in line with a willingness to help users better use HTA results. In road shows, a small team that includes evaluators goes on the road to meet the various potential users in a region, describe the agency's mandate and activities, explain the basic scientifi c principles of HTA, and summarize recent reports that are of interest to that particular group. The CEOs were particularly enthusiastic about these outreach activities that go beyond the mere dissemination of reports to include capacity-building components.
As mentioned above, several evaluators thought that patients and the general public should be informed about HTA, but could not envision a way other than via the media to make assessments available to such undefi ned audiences. Nonetheless, the contents of the interviews revealed considerable discomfort when it came to dealing with media questions (reactive) and conveying information to the media (proactive). A number of senior evaluators and CEOs said that although they usually agreed to interviews with journalists (print, TV, and radio), they needed preparation and the support of communications staff. From a proactive perspective, only a few agencies reported having issued the periodic press release. Communications staff emphasized how the topic had to be controversial or of concern to a large segment of the population (e.g., cardiovascular disease or breast cancer) for it to be of any interest to journalists. Most of them were quite aware that time and space matter, both in print and on the air, which makes it particularly challenging when having to explain subtle issues such as methodological limitations, surgical risks, or false negative or false positive test results. Nonetheless, the agencies seemed to believe that the media are the only way to reach the public, and they were sometimes called upon to defend their position publicly. One agency had implemented a fairly sophisticated mechanism to avoid committing any public faux pas. As one evaluator (agency 6) explained, "Before the information becomes public, we hold stakeholder meetings. With the input of the working group, we assess our key audiences. [In the prerelease meeting], we give them a briefi ng on what we have found and how we did the study-we help them prepare so that when the media release does happen, if someone approaches them, they can answer any questions and concerns about the report knowledgeably. We also debrief the Ministry-13. These are described as assertive because they are initiated by the agencies and because they not only educate about the role of HTA in general, but also teach the specifi c skills needed to use HTA fi ndings, that is, capacity building. that's standard." In general, the agencies seemed to be extremely careful when dealing with the media, especially those involved in covering daily news. We did not observe any instances of dissemination through weekly or monthly magazines or through any other media less motivated by controversy or breakthroughs and more inclined to publish educational or informative material.
Devising effective dissemination strategies requires defi ning the users and their informational needs and preferences. The strategies that we described above refl ect in part what the Canadian agencies think their users expect and are able to digest. Although the range of methods that the agencies have developed is rather impressive, it is also the case that they have been applied on an ad hoc basis, rather than as part of an overall communications plan that applies to all reports and HTA-derived products. As the last section of our results will make clearer, CEOs and evaluators seem to have jumped into HTA dissemination while not necessarily agreeing on the rationale behind it.
User Involvement: High or Low?
Almost all interviewees qualifi ed the relationships with users as positive, using words such as "respectful," "excellent," "healthy," "fairly collegial," "trustful," "reliable," or "pretty good." However, a few evaluators mentioned that there were a number of "naysayers," "suspicious physicians," and "distant" groups. Three agencies (3, 5, and 6) had established advisory committees comprised of representatives of different stakeholder groups, which were consulted during the priority-setting phase. These committees were seen as a good vehicle for increasing awareness of the agency's activities, gradually establishing trust through face-to-face contact and instilling a culture of evaluation among stakeholders from different levels of the health care system (clinical practice, management, planning). Only two agencies (2 and 6) had mechanisms to facilitate the participation of users in the evaluation process (through working groups or partnerships), and two agencies (1 and 3) insisted on keeping a distance between evaluators and decision makers to avoid biases in the scientifi c process.
As mentioned earlier, evaluators recognize that the attitude of users toward the usefulness of HTA will partly depend upon the conclusions of the reports. This explains why in a number of jurisdictions physicians are seen as less receptive toward HTA. Some assessments may uncover clinical practices that are questionable (e.g., variations in surgical procedures), whereas other assessments may support the government's refusal to fund expensive equipment (e.g., imaging devices). However, this ambivalent attitude toward HTA is also found in government offi cials. An assessment may conclude that additional budget money should be allocated to a particular innovative practice (e.g., the left ventricular assist device) or the opposite, that an innovation has been funded too hastily and without suffi cient targeting of health needs (e.g., telemedicine), which may then put the Ministry of Health in an embarrassing position. Evaluators from agencies that form partnerships during the evaluation process emphasized that confl icts may arise and need to be managed properly. Particular attitudes and skills may be required, such as respect for each other's opinion and fi nding solutions that do not compromise the quality of the assessment.
Interviewees from agencies that prefer to maintain a distance from decision makers held a slightly cynical view on how users react to assessments. For example, one CEO (agency 1) was critical of the lag in time between the government's request for a report and its acting on the results of the report: "The Ministry has this sort of 'hurry up and wait attitude'-in other words, hurry up we need this report, we need this report, so we give them the report and then we hear back from them a year or so later." Rapid turnover in government offi cials was mentioned by several interviewees as an obstacle to establishing continuity in relationships. The problem is exacerbated when offi cials are not seen as suffi ciently knowledgeable about HTA. According to one evaluator (agency 1), the lack of long-term planning is also problematic: "The requests become part of a crisis management strategy, rather than part of an overall plan by a forward-looking group of people at the Ministry. Ideally, I would have thought that there should be a group of people from our agency and a group from the Ministry working together and thinking ahead-not about the political hot potatoes for the government this year, but about strategies for the next ten years, such as what sort of evaluation research would help us plan the system." Perhaps unsatisfactory and unstable relationships with users have caused evaluators to become skeptical about the ability of HTA to shape decision and policy making, which certainly slows down HTA institutionalization.
Although CEOs were quite articulate about their views on the role of different stakeholders in their jurisdiction, evaluators deplored the fact that they are often not aware of what happens or does not happen with their reports once they are released. A few interviewees mentioned that they did not feel suffi ciently knowledgeable about how decisions are made in the health care system. In fact, in several agencies, dissemination directly involving government offi cials or representatives from medical associa-tions was under the responsibility of the CEO and a few senior evaluators, with the support of communications staff. One may wonder how these evaluators can develop and write assessments that are targeting the needs of users if they have only a vague idea of who these users are and how they may use scientifi c results.
To synthesize our fi ndings, we now wish to make more explicit the relationship between the visions and the key domains we analyzed. As mentioned earlier, because the three visions embody very different justifi cations for increasing dissemination of HTA, they can serve as a heuristic device to schematize the type of strategies agencies deploy and their ways of interacting with decision makers. Figure 2 graphically shows the position of each vision and of each agency with respect to the two analytical axes: dissemination strategy (active vs. passive) and level of user involvement (high vs. low). The science-driven HTA vision, which sees passive dissemination as suffi cient and does not seek user involvement in the evaluation process, is located in the lower left quadrant. The pragmatic HTA vision is situated in the lower right quadrant because the role of users in the evaluation process remains low, whereas two-way dissemination means are seen as desirable. The participatory HTA vision, located in the upper right quadrant, is the only one in which the traditional production process is modifi ed to integrate users' concerns. 14 The agencies were positioned on fi gure 2 with the help of the key fi ndings summarized in tables 3a and 3b. Four agencies (1, 2, 3, and 6) predominantly operate according to a single vision, whereas the other two (4 and 5) share attributes of at least two visions. As indicated in table 3a, agency 1 does not engage in active dissemination or, as in table 3b, involve users during the production process. By contrast, agency 2 adopts the opposite approach-active dissemination and high user involvement. As evidenced by its prerelease meetings, road shows, and working groups during the evaluation process, agency 6 also espouses vision 3 to a great extent. Agency 4, which uses active dissemination methods, sits on the horizontal axis because we did not fi nd evidence of a high level of user involvement ("links with users during the evaluation process"). Agency 5 sits between visions 1 and 2 because face-to-face interaction is seen as a very important method of dissemination. However, because there are very few interactions with users during the process, this agency's position remains under the horizontal axis. Finally, agency 3 operates mainly according to vision 2, although its road shows represent a major initiative in promoting HTA uptake. It is positioned lower than agency 5 and in this quadrant because distance is maintained between users and evaluators during the whole process. Overall, fi ve of the six agencies have devised and tested active dissemination strategies. Only two (2 and 6) have established mechanisms to truly involve users during the evaluation process.
Discussion: Strengths, Limitations, and Trade-offs of the Three Visions
This research focused on the emerging discourses and practices of six major Canadian HTA-producing organizations concerning the dissemination of HTA. Our general assumption was that the process by which HTA results are conveyed to decision makers is strongly infl uenced by how HTA practitioners perceive who their target users are and why and how 14. The three visions were robust patterns emerging from the analysis of the interviews. In examining fi gure 2, one may wonder what vision would theoretically fi t in the fourth quadrant. Tentatively, we would suggest an extreme form of the participatory vision, one that would foster a very high level of user involvement throughout the evaluation process, after which dissemination would be seen as superfl uous or redundant. Thus, the need for active dissemination would be extremely low because the capacity to use HTA would be in some way internalized by a large set of collaborating institutional players. these users should use evidence derived from HTA. This assumption fl ows from a recognition that the knowledge-based changes these knowledge infrastructures are seeking to foster occur in a complex, pluralistic policy arena that involves a broad array of organized players having specifi c and at times confl icting goals. Through the rationalizations of interviewees, we discovered three visions that shape both the manner in which decisions are seen as permeable to scientifi c results and the appropriateness of interacting with users during the evaluation process. Our case analyses revealed that three confl icting visions coexisted and that strategies were at best applied in an ad hoc manner. 15 Nonetheless, from the broader institutional theory perspective, what are the strengths and limitations of the three visions? We will now examine their various trade-offs shaped, among other things, by the agency's sociopolitical orientation and internal resource management and the routinization of external relationships (Smith 1997: 103) .
Although knowledge transfer has been gaining incredible impetus in recent years in the North American and European health scenes (Lavis et al. 2002) , as several research funding organizations are both funding initiatives in that area and requesting researchers to design studies relevant to decision makers, the issue does in fact embody an old preoccupation. Scholars in the fi eld of policy research and evaluation have been emphasizing for a while the need for increased interactions between producers and users of knowledge, the unpredictable unfolding of decision making, and the resolutely political nature of policy making (Weiss 1991; Cabatoff 1996; Chelimsky 1997; Melkers and Roessner 1997) . However, this renewed interest in knowledge transfer carries with it a number of implicit assumptions. When writing up our analyses of the three visions, we were aware that readers may have more sympathy for the third vision-because of its participatory fl avor-than for the fi rst vision, which might be seen as a little outdated. Despite a spontaneous allegiance to an open and transparent way of producing HTA, we would like to put ideologies aside for the moment and examine the strengths and limitations of these visions and their institutional trade-offs.
Indeed, all three visions may prove appropriate in specifi c institutional environments. According to Giddens (1984) , the current structure and rules of institutions should not be taken for granted. From a historical perspective, routinization 16 plays a key role in the reproduction of existing institutions and their gradual transformation. More precisely, the six jurisdictions in which the agencies are located represent very diverse policy arenas, wherein access to resources and expertise is uneven. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the ability of an agency to co-opt resources and establish legitimate and reliable interactions with other players is crucial. Two provinces have a population of less than 3 million, making it likely that experts and bureaucrats must wear several hats, a structural feature that may facilitate frequent and long-term interactions between evaluators and decision makers (Lomas 1990) . Three provinces have a population between 4 and 11 million and a concentration of numerous large players (pharmaceutical and biomedical equipment industries, lobby groups). The complexity of such institutional contexts and the presence of health-related regulatory bodies (more frequent in bigger provinces) may push agencies to increase specialization and narrow the range of their interlocutors to concentrate their communication efforts effectively. Besides, the agency operating at the national level is caught in an institutional dilemma-because health care is under provincial jurisdiction, it cannot issue prescriptive recommendations, although it does play a special role in smaller provinces and territories devoid of an HTA agency. In other words, to establish legitimate institutional routines, its processes supporting institutionalization of HTA-derived products should be adapted to the varying needs of decision makers across the country, including those who may have already established regular links with a provincial agency and those who have poor access to such expertise.
Hence, we believe that before rejecting any vision of how HTA should be disseminated, it is important to examine in greater detail the mandate and activities of regulatory bodies (for both drugs and devices), the presence and culture of providers and patients associations, the administrative powers, and the structural links between all these institutional players (van Eijndhoven 1997) . Establishing a productive match between an HTA agency's mission and its institutional environment is certainly key in the operationalization of knowledge-based changes in health care systems. Given the diversity of the regulatory structures and the heterogeneity of the expectations toward HTA, one may wonder whether and how such a thing could happen. It is nonetheless likely that, over time and with sustained interactions between HTA producers and a range of stakeholders, 16. Defi ned as "the prevalence of familiar styles and forms of conduct, both supporting and supported by a sense of ontological security" (Giddens 1984: 376). an optimal match could be worked out. It would require, among other things, strong leadership at the provincial level and thorough refl ection about incentives for greater interstructural collaboration. Further research could illuminate these issues in greater depth (for a discussion of the need for a stronger interface between HTA production and use see Hivon et al. 2005 and Lehoux et al. n.d.) . For the moment, this study points to the following three observations.
(1) The science-driven HTA vision: The legitimacy of disinterested science evolving in isolation from decision making. The science-driven HTA vision draws the clearest line between science and regulation. It is therefore highly compatible with the science-driven model of knowledge utilization, which assumes that social agents will know where to seek scientifi c fi ndings and how to derive practical implications from them (Denis, Lehoux, and Champagne 2004 ). An agency adhering to this vision will make its reports available and encourage its evaluators to disseminate results mainly to audiences that are seen as credible, that is, able to contribute and appreciate the advancement of science (other scientists and clinicians doing research). Dissemination of HTA fi ndings takes on a more circumscribed meaning, involving the publishing of reports in a reader-friendly electronic or paper format. The role of the communications staff may thus be limited to packaging the reports and updating the Web site. The agency's independence is, theoretically at least, protected because there are no interactions with groups holding vested interests. Evaluators may thus build for themselves a traditional scientifi c career, without having to accommodate the needs of decision makers or having to become more familiar with policy making and regulation of the health care system. The legitimacy of such an agency will thrive in institutional environments that strongly respect and value science in general, and health sciences in particular. This vision has the merit of clearly recognizing that it is the decision maker's responsibility to take action based on scientifi c results. The risk lies in not being able to produce HTA reports that correspond to the expectations of decision makers. Therefore, agencies adhering to this vision may have to justify their existence with a rationale that differs from the main thrust of the knowledge transfer movement. We tend to believe that their role can be legitimized by the quality of their scientifi c output, rather than their direct impact on policy and practice. To position themselves in a given institutional environment, agencies operating according to vision 1 may seek to play science against sociopolitical pressures, may fi rst and foremost invest their internal resources in knowledge production, and may establish perhaps pivotal but very few external relationships, for example, with funders and other scientifi c organizations.
(2) The pragmatic HTA vision: The realism of useful science searching for alliances to infl uence decision making. The pragmatic HTA vision contains a higher level of ambiguity than the other visions-dissemination takes on a broader signifi cance than it does under the sciencedriven HTA vision, and impacts on policy and decisions are not seen as the direct result of effort invested in dissemination. Such a vision implies that HTA remains one among a variety of factors infl uencing decisions, a situation that may weaken the call for increased HTA dissemination. However, it has the merit of holding a realistic attitude about the complexity of bringing knowledge-based changes into health care systems. The pragmatic HTA vision, unlike the participatory HTA vision, does not necessarily wish to invest in strengthening the ability of decision makers to use scientifi c evidence, for example, capacity building. It therefore sits well among Canadian funding organizations' initiatives in the area of capacity building, such as the Alberta Swift and Effi cient Application of Research in Community Health and the training program for health care executives that the Canadian Health Services Research Foundation launched in 2004. The pragmatic HTA vision may thus be able to play a key role in institutional environments that are promoting HTA-derived products and creating opportunities for their use. An interesting option for agencies adhering to the pragmatic HTA vision would be to cooperate with a third-party organization to disseminate their results as well. Because most active dissemination methods are time consuming and require a certain level of communication skills on the part of evaluators, it may prove appropriate to share this responsibility with people who possess hands-on expertise in this fi eld and who can maintain regular links with an array of users (e.g., knowledge brokering). Furthermore, such an interaction may contribute to making evaluators better aware of the informational needs and constraints of decision makers. In this way, agencies could legitimize their role in terms of both the quality and the usefulness of their outputs. Thus, to position themselves in a given institutional environment, vision 2 agencies will be interested in understanding the sociopolitical context in which they evolve, may increase the proportion of their resources devoted to dissemination (including contracting out), and may interact more regularly with external partners that are seen as contributing to the institutionalization of HTA.
(3) The participatory HTA vision: The assertiveness of well-intentioned science internalizing decision making. Among the visions, the participatory HTA vision has absorbed the greatest number of principles and values of the knowledge transfer movement. It seems highly compatible with current social movements looking for consultative and deliberative policy making (Bohman 1996) . The interviewees adhering to this vision explained how capacity building is built into the evaluation process through close interactions between evaluators and users and through endorsement of the mentoring role. Perhaps a new breed of evaluators will be required for this vision to be fully implemented, as communication and pedagogical skills are necessary for each evaluator who is asked to participate directly to the processes supporting the institutionalization of HTA-derived products. Because the whole approach is time consuming (but may still prove effi cient when factoring in the long-term impacts on decision making), it may be appropriate to target key decision makers and establish long-term partnerships. Agencies adhering to the participatory HTA vision can probably legitimize their role in terms of impact more easily than agencies adhering to the other two visions. By internalizing users in the production process, the intervention on their institutional environment is more consistent with the idea that increased dissemination will lead to increased infl uence on decision makers. Nonetheless, it is not certain that a small group of evaluators can establish partnerships with numerous stakeholders, especially when they have confl icting goals. In particular, close partnerships with certain groups (i.e., an association of midwives) may be seen as illegitimate or discretionary by other groups (i.e., an association of obstetricians). Therefore, positioning themselves in a given institutional environment may well remain a constant struggle for vision 3 agencies, who will be seen as sociopolitically engaged, may devote a sizable portion of their internal resources to knowledge transfer rather than to knowledge production, and may establish close but contestable partnerships with a few groups.
Conclusion
Given the trade-offs we just underscored, none of the three visions appears clearly superior. From an institutional theory perspective, their relative performance will largely depend on the types of knowledge and HTAderived products an agency is able to deliver (given its human and fi nancial resources) and on its ability to defi ne and maintain legitimate rela-tionships with funders, health care providers, and decision makers within the broader context of a civil society that is growing reluctant to leave the formulation of public policies solely in the hands of experts and scientists (ibid.; Giddens 1984) .
Before concluding this article, the main limits of our study should be made explicit. First, we studied the challenges raised by the second phase of HTA development at a time when strategies to meet these challenges are only just emerging and the broader Canadian health research scene is being transformed. As emphasized by John Lavis and colleagues (2002: 146) , "Researchers (and research funders) should create more opportunities for interactions with the potential users of their research. They should consider such activities as part of the 'real' work of research, not a superfl uous add-on. And they should assign a higher priority to developing and acknowledging in others the skills required to promote this interaction."
At the time of this study, the six agencies were all trying to think of ways to improve current methods or devising new ways to disseminate their fi ndings. For instance, several of them had signifi cantly improved their Web sites, and a few had assessed the quality and usefulness of providing users with new types of HTA products (rapid technology assessments, electronic newsletters, etc.). Although we are confi dent about the transferability of our results to similar knowledge infrastructures operating in complex health policy arenas, our study reveals perceptions and strategies that may evolve rapidly in the next few years through increased interactions with, and feedback from, HTA users.
Second, the three visions we described should not be interpreted as rigid archetypes or mutually exclusive categories of how HTA is disseminated in Canada. More than one vision may be applied by a given agency, depending on the characteristics of the assessment. In addition, according to Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson (1995) , accounts cannot be treated as "simply representations of the world; they are part of the world they describe and are thus shaped by the contexts in which they occur" (quoted in Murphy et al. 1998: 122) . In this perspective, we sought to increase the robustness of our fi ndings by examining not only what interviewees said about dissemination but also what agencies did about it.
Third, the labels we used to describe the visions and trade-offs should not mask the complexity of the relationships between science in decision and policy making. According to Lomas (1990: 528) , "Researchers who wish to have an impact on policy will presumably adopt frameworks implied by the values of their potential audiences." The science-driven HTA vision may clearly involve "doing politics" through science, for example, constructing and using scientifi c evidence to persuade other groups that are receptive to evidence to adhere to a certain way of seeing the value of a given technology. Evidence may not be the unproblematic result of pure science, but rather another layer of argumentation to support government policies or undermine claims by other groups (physician and patient associations) for greater and improved access to innovations. Furthermore, it is somewhat paradoxical that the participatory HTA vision, which explicitly recognizes the importance of the social processes through which evidence is being constructed, may be more amenable to potential attacks by unsatisfi ed groups. Indeed, further research should seek to better understand how the status of HTA evidence is being defi ned by both HTA producers and users and how this particular type of evidence operates both implicitly and explicitly in the real world of decision and policy making.
Despite these limitations, we hope that our results will forward the current debate on the contribution of HTA, and health research in general, to the transformation of health care systems in industrialized countries. The content of the interviews suggests that there is an important need for evaluators and CEOs to defi ne and articulate their visions about how their agencies should operate. If a particular vision was clear in most interviewees' minds, it was not suffi ciently coherent at the agency level to translate into consistent organizational routines and strategies and to sustain foreseeable and productive external relationships with users. Deploying dissemination strategies that do not correspond to a coherent vision may prove ineffective and perhaps even inappropriate in certain circumstances. For instance, if one truly adheres to a science-driven HTA vision, attempting to increase decision makers' uptake through a face-to-face interaction once the assessment is completed may prove frustrating for both parties because their expectations may differ greatly. The HTA producer might believe that science almost speaks for itself and immediate action should therefore be taken, whereas the HTA user might feel that the research question was so narrow that engaging in that research was dubious in the fi rst place. Now that knowledge transfer is clearly increasing in several areas, decision makers do anticipate certain outputs and forms of interactions with researchers. At the agency level, using a variety of rambling dissemination strategies in a context of limited human and fi nancial resources would not only create inconsistencies but also generate greater ambiguity for decision makers.
Furthermore, we observed striking differences in how interviewees within the same agency valued reaching out to certain types of users that have generally been seen as less signifi cant (individual patients, the general public). Researchers may hardly reach out to community organizations or patient groups-structuring their assessment according to a participatory HTA vision-if the agency has rarely done so in the past or if this strategic decision has not been fully endorsed by the board of directors. We also noted that a number of dissemination strategies for reaching large groups have not been explored, such as regularly feeding continuous medical education sections in medical journals, publishing chronicles in monthly women's magazines, or contributing to television programs (with a focus on health or science). This absence supports the observation that CEOs and evaluators have not fully examined the dissemination strategies that would be consistent with the three visions we observed.
Finally, our study indicates that the interface between communications specialists and evaluators needs to be articulated. Bridging the gap between the conclusions of a scientifi c endeavor and the concrete recommendations for action may require skills that are yet to be defi ned. Among other things, researchers and communication staff will have to develop a more critical and informed understanding of the sociopolitical dynamics of the health policy arena, to agree on the messages that may be derived from a particular assessment, and to anticipate and deal with potential confl icts when such messages are circulated widely. Further research should examine how effective and politically suitable forms of interactions between HTA producers and stakeholders pursuing different goals can be achieved.
